When Urdu was the dominant language in Afghanistan

In the 1930s, no foreign language was more dominant in Afghanistan than Urdu. At no time in Afghanistan’s history did Urdu have more influence in the corridors of power in Kabul than in the 1930s. After Persian, Urdu was also the most widely spoken language by the officials of the Afghan government. As such, neither Bollywood introduced Afghans to Urdu (a widely held misconception), nor did Afghans initially learn Urdu after immigrating to Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Afghans have a longer history of utilising the Urdu language. To begin with, Afghan King Mohammad Nadir Khan (1929-1933) was a fluent Urdu speaker. Mohammad had been born in 1883 in Dehradun and had spent the first 18 years of his life in India. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) had exiled Mohammad’s family from Afghanistan to India, where they lived until after Amir’s death in 1901. When Indian religious scholar Maulana Syed Sulaiman Nadvi (who later became Pakistani after Partition) visited King Mohammad in Kabul in October 1933, they initially greeted each other and exchanged pleasantries in Persian. Later on, they started conversing in Urdu and continued to do so until the end of their meeting. Like King Mohammad, his brothers were also fluent in Urdu. His younger brother Sardar Shah Wali Khan, who was born in 1888 in Dehradun and received his education there, spoke Urdu as fluently as King Mohammad himself, and arrived in Pakistan in April 1948 as Afghanistan’s first ambassador to Pakistan. A few months later, he was invited to a gathering by the Aligarh Muslim University’s Old Boys’ Association in Karachi where he addressed the attendees in Urdu. Similarly, King Mohammad’s youngest brother, Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, also spoke Urdu fluently. He was also born in Dehradun in 1890 and was a student of Maulvi Najaf Ali Khan. Najaf’s brother, Dr Abdul Ghani Jalalpuri, the principal of Islamia College in Lahore, had served as principal of the Habibia School (Afghanistan’s first modern school) in Kabul, and was a member of the Afghan delegation to Rawalpindi (July-August 1919) to negotiate the terms of the Afghan independence with British authorities. A group picture of Afghan government officials in the 1930s. PHOTO: UNESCO In those days, King Nadir and his family ran Afghanistan like a family business. Most positions of power were occupied by the king's immediate family members, all of whom had spent time in India and learned Urdu there. The next generation of the Afghan royal family, however, would learn European languages instead of Urdu. The process of learning European languages had begun under King Amanullah Khan in the 1920s, and would reach relative maturity some years later. In Kabul, the elder members of the Afghan royal family, such as King Nadir and his brothers, were believed to even speak Urdu at home. It would not have been surprising as the elder members of the Afghan royal family had learned Urdu at a young age while living and studying in India. King Nadir’s attachment with the Urdu language continued throughout his life. Even as king, he would receive Urdu journals and newspapers from India on a regular basis. In addition to the Afghan royal family’s attachment with and utilisation of Urdu, the Afghan government employed Indian citizens to teach in Afghan schools and to undertake technical assignments such as operating machines in factories. When the Habibia School was founded in 1903 by Amir Habibullah Khan, the majority of its teachers were Indians, who taught in Urdu and Persian. Urdu was also desirable for the fact that Afghan students who wished to continue further studies in India needed to know Urdu. From a traditional Afghan perspective, travelling to non-Muslim Europe, for educational purposes or otherwise, was frowned upon and unwelcome. India was considered to be the nearest, most economical and culturally appropriate option. King Amanullah, however, in the 1920s, replaced Urdu as a medium of education with Turkish and European languages such as French and German. In the early 1930s, there were nearly 200 Indian teachers and skilled workers in Kabul. Maqboolul Haq Ghazipuri, who initially taught at the Habibia School and then took up an assignment at the government-run sewing factory, and Sayed Abdullah (originally from Peshawar), who served as vice chief of the Afghan army, were just two out of the many prominent Urdu speakers of Indian origin who were employed by the Afghan government. In the 1930s, there was a group of Indian Muslim religious scholars who resided in Kabul. Chief amongst them were Maulana Saifur Rahman, former teacher at Delhi’s Fatehpuri Madrassa, and Maulana Mansoor Ansari, former director of the religious studies department at the Aligarh Muslim University. In addition to the Indian scholars, there were also several Afghan graduates from Darul Oloom-e-Deoband and other institutions in India that lived in Kabul. All of these Afghan and Indian gentlemen understood and spoke Urdu fluently. Furthermore, Afghan businessmen — especially Afghanistan’s Hindus and Sikhs — were another group of Urdu speakers in Kabul since they would regularly travel between India and Afghanistan . At the time, India was Afghanistan’s largest trading partner, and Afghanistan relied on Indian seaports for trade and commerce. Finally, Afghan government officials and employees, as well as their families, who were posted to India used to come back with fluent Urdu skills. At the time, Afghanistan had trade offices and commercial representations across North India. A large number of Afghan government employees, government-affiliated individuals, and their families lived in India. For instance, the popular Afghan singer Ustad Mohammad Sadeq Fetrat Nashenas spent about seven years in different Indian cities in the 1940s during his childhood. The singer's father worked as a bank-i-milli Afghan (an Afghan public-private bank) representative in India in the 1940s. Sadeq and his mother had gone to India with his father. At Delhi’s Jamia Millia Islamia, Dr Zakir Husain, who would later become India’s first Muslim president, taught the young Sadeq Urdu and Persian. Moreover, in the 1950s, long before Sadeq became a popular singer, Radio Afghanistan’s Urdu programme organiser, Amir Jan Gran, who himself had spent time in India and learned Urdu there, recruited the singer as an Urdu language presenter, and his Urdu skills would also come in handy several years later. When Pakistan and India reached an agreement in Tashkent in January 1966 to end the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Radio Moscow asked Sadeq, who at the time was pursuing his postgraduate studies in the Soviet Union, to commemorate the occasion with a musical piece. In light of this, Sadeq composed and sang two Urdu songs. His first Urdu song was based on one of Faiz Ahmad Faiz’s poems, for which the opening verses are: گلوں میں رنگ بھرے باد نوبہار چلے چلے بھی آؤ کہ گلشن کا کاروبار چلے Like the new breeze of spring, that grants blossoms their hues Come forth love, grant the garden leave to go about its business His second Urdu song was based on one of Ali Sardar Jafri’s poems, which starts as follows: یہ روز وصال یاراں ہے یہ جشن بادہ گساراں ہے Faiz was accompanying President of Pakistan Mohammad Ayub Khan on his trip to the Soviet Union in 1966, while Ali Sardar was accompanying the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. Hence, it was remarkable that Radio Moscow would ask an Afghan singer to commemorate the India-Pakistan agreement. Sadeq’s command of both the Urdu language and music was the decisive factor in Radio Moscow’s decision to ask him for the favour. With the passage of time, due to Afghans’ familiarity with Urdu, many Urdu terms and phrases have either replaced their Persian counterparts or are used in tandem with Persian in Afghanistan. For example, Afghans have abandoned the Persian term khiaban in favour of its Urdu counterpart sarak. For money, Afghans use the Urdu term paisa more than the Persian term pool. Afghans use gadi, derived from the Urdu term gari, for a horse-drawn two-wheeled carts or tangas. Moreover, Afghans across Afghanistan also use the Urdu suffix wala commonly in combination with hundreds of terms. For instance, terms such as akhbarwala, chaiwala, khanawala and motorwala have been in use for decades. It is common knowledge that Persian has heavily influenced Urdu, but in Afghanistan’s case, Urdu has also influenced both Persian and Pashto. As the most widely spoken foreign language, Urdu’s influence in Afghanistan back then was more pronounced than at any time in Afghanistan’s history.

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Filed Under: The Express Tribune on Thursday 16 December 2021

A letter to Mrs Priyantha Kumara from an ashamed Pakistani

Dear Mrs Priyantha Kumara, As I write these lines, you would be receiving the remains of your husband. The husband you knew as a loving and living human being, your life partner, with whom you must have shared a lifetime of beautiful memories. Father of your children... children who would still be wondering and will always wonder as to what really happened. Son of a mother…mother who still doesn’t know about his death. I am writing to you as an ashamed and embarrassed citizen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. As a member of a violent and extreme society. My head is hung in shame, and I can’t stop thinking about Priyantha. I wish I could say to you “I know how you feel”. But I won’t. Because I don’t. How does anyone feel seeing their loved ones beaten to death? I try to imagine myself as Priyantha and I wonder about his thoughts. I wonder and I cry thinking how he must be praying to see you and the kids one last time. How he must be asking himself what did he really do to deserve the wrath of the mob? I will tell you the truth, that I have imagined myself and my loved ones in this situation so many times. Do you wonder why? Because I live in this country, and I am scared that someday someone will decide my fate like this. Someday someone will announce that I or my loved ones no longer fit in the mould of their beliefs. I have imagined this. The thought of it alone sends shivers down my spine. So I can’t tell you 'I know how you feel' because I can’t. Because no one can. I wish to tell you about Malik Adnan. The only human in the sea of beasts who tried to save your husband. I wish I could tell you that Adnan is the real Pakistan and not the angry mob. But I can’t. Because I am done pretending and lying. The truth is that Adnan is a rare species. People like him either don’t exist in our society or they hide with their thoughts and ideas. Adnan is brave. Adnan is courageous. Adnan had the power to stand in front of a crowd and defend your husband. I wish I could tell you that our prime minister, ministers and religious leaders are as brave as Adnan. But I can’t, because that’s not true. If our governments (past and present) were half as brave as Adnan, your husband would still be alive. If they were half as courageous as Adnan, we wouldn’t be thinking about leaving this country for good. But they have to get the popular vote. They have to have the power. They can’t anger the mob. They can’t stand it. They are cowards. They make 'peace' deals with terrorist organisations. They are the real face of Pakistan. I wish I could tell you that this was a lone 'incident'. One that will never happen again. One that has never happened before. But I can’t, because it’s not true. It happened in 2012 in Chunni Goth, it happened in 2012 in Goth Seeta, it happened in 2014 in Kot Radha Kishan, it happened in 2017 in Mardan. These are only the famous blasphemy lynching cases. In the very city of Sialkot, not too long ago, two young brothers were brutally lunched by the mob on suspicion of robbery. I wish I could tell you that, as our prime minister promised, the culprits of your husband’s murder will be brought to justice. But I can’t because it’s not true. In the four 'incidents' I mentioned, not a single one of the culprits was given the death sentence. Most of them simply got away. Some served some sentence and are already out or about to get out. So I will tell you not to get your hopes too high. You will be disappointed. I wish I could tell you that this heinous murder does not depict the true Pakistan. But I can’t because it’s not true. It is the true picture of Pakistan. Most of us won’t go out and murder people but secretly we would admire them. We would condemn the killing but follow it with a “but” and “if”. We hail murderers as heroes and attend their funerals in big numbers. I wish I could tell you that love is powerful and it changes everything. But I can’t because it’s not true. Hate is a much more powerful weapon. It takes over the people, their beliefs, their faith, their lives. It blinds them. It tells them that human life means nothing. We have slowly nurtured the seeds of hatred in our society. Now they have become big giant trees overpowering everything sane we knew. Hate, I tell you, is much more powerful than love. Mrs Priyantha! I am sorry. I have nothing to say that would make you feel better. I confess that I have nothing but shame. I confess that our government will have nothing but hollow words. I confess that we have already died. Our souls have left. We walk around in these barren bodies deprived of love, sanity and humanity. I confess that we, Pakistanis, will forget your husband in a few days just like we forgot the Army Public School (APS) massacre, Mughees and Muneeb Butt, Shama and Shahzad, Mashal Khan and 80,000 other Pakistanis who lost their lives for nothing. I am sorry, An ashamed Pakistani

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Filed Under: The Express Tribune on Tuesday 14 December 2021

The importance of Turkmenistan’s pragmatic Taliban stance

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow expressed a very pragmatic stance towards the Taliban while addressing the United Nations General Assembly via video earlier this week. Publicly financed Russian international media outlet TASS quoted him as saying the following: “The situation there (in Afghanistan — TASS) is not easy, the government and public institutions that are being formed are very fragile. This is why assessing the situation in the country requires ultimate consistency, prudence and responsibility — both in words and actions. The situation in Afghanistan has changed, and when forming an approach to it, one needs to abandon ideological preferences, old grudges, phobias and stereotypes, thinking first and foremost about the Afghan people who are tired of wars and turbulences and dream of a peaceful and quiet life. We call for normalising the situation in Afghanistan as soon as possible and expect that new government agencies will operate effectively in the interests of all Afghan people.” The world should take note of his country’s position towards Afghanistan’s de facto leaders even though some governments such as Russia’s still officially consider them to be terrorists in spite of pragmatically engaging with them in the interests of peace and security. First, President Berdimuhamedow acknowledged that the Taliban is in the process of forming a government and reshaping public institutions. This is an objective reflection of the facts. These structures are indeed very fragile at the moment, yet the former insurgent group is still doing its best to manage everything. Afghanistan’s foreign stakeholders mustn’t have unrealistic expectations, hence the recommended need to exercise “ultimate consistency, prudence and responsibility – both in words and actions.” Pressuring the Taliban to immediately comply with those states’ envisioned socio-political models can actually be counterproductive. Political statements to that effect are one thing while actions are another entirely. The US froze Afghanistan’s foreign assets within its jurisdiction and pressured the international financial institutions under its influence, the IMF and World Bank, to suspend their loan programs. This risks worsening the country’s cascading crises. By contrast, Pakistan and Tajikistan agreed last week to facilitate talks between the Taliban and rebellious Tajiks. This noble gesture might not succeed, but it’s still better to gently apply diplomacy for encouraging a peaceful resolution of Afghanistan’s problems than to weaponise financial instruments as political punishment. President Berdimuhamedow’s wisest words during his speech were his suggestion that “one needs to abandon ideological preferences, old grudges, phobias and stereotypes, thinking first and foremost about the Afghan people who are tired of wars and turbulences and dream of a peaceful and quiet life.” This can be interpreted as a subtle message to India, Iran, Tajikistan, and the Afghan groups that are under their influence. Those three countries and the groups within Afghanistan that are most sympathetic to them have to acknowledge that the majority of Afghans are very relieved that the war has finally ended. Attempting to stir trouble through those governments’ provocative statements and those groups’ actions is against the will of the Afghan people. It’s time to move on and chart a new future for the country. The Taliban deserve a chance to fulfill their promises but they’ll require some time to do so since stability comes first. This pressing need explains why its recently appointed acting authorities are all Taliban members and thus don’t adequately represent Afghanistan’s ethno-political diversity. The group preferred reliable and trusted individuals over fresh faces because they didn’t want to risk any deadlock or inefficiency at this crucial moment. Nevertheless, these optics prompted concerns that the Taliban hadn’t truly changed, but such worries are more representative of some – though importantly not all – of those observers’ “ideological preferences, old grudges, phobias and stereotypes”. They’re judging the Taliban through those prisms instead of having an open mind. It’s admittedly difficult to take the Taliban’s claims to have reformed at face value, especially when the composition of its acting authorities seems to discredit those hopes, but the group also has a valid point in wanting to prioritise stability right after the war instead of immediately experimenting with political reforms. What President Berdimuhamedow appears to be implying is that it’s simply too early to draw any conclusions, and that those who’ve already arrived at pessimistic ones aren’t being objective. It’s acceptable to have some concerns, but unacceptable to exploit them as the pretext for pressuring the Taliban via words and actions. Doing so could inadvertently contribute to further destabilising Afghanistan, especially with respect to the West’s weaponisation of financial instruments during the moment when the country needs such aid more desperately than ever in order to stave off its impending humanitarian crisis. The Turkmen leader’s appeal “for normalising the situation in Afghanistan as soon as possible” and his “expect[ation] that new government agencies will operate effectively in the interests of all Afghan people”  can be interpreted as a message to both the Taliban and the country’s foreign stakeholders. He’s telling the first to remain committed to its previously promised reforms even if they still take some time to transpire since he believes that they’re truly “in the interests of all Afghan people”. As for the second, he’d like them to acknowledge the Taliban’s de facto leadership of the country and pragmatically engage with it. It would be contradictory to “the interests of all Afghan people” if the Taliban went back on its promises and/or the country’s foreign stakeholders refused to pragmatically engage with group. Turkmenistan’s position should be regarded as the world’s most objective one considering the country’s constitutionally neutral status. The Central Asian state isn’t regarded as a partisan actor in any respects, whether in the Afghan Conflict or wherever else. It hasn’t joined any regional blocs, not even the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), though it has positive working ties with them and others. Turkmenistan therefore has unparalleled moral legitimacy to speak on Afghanistan. The country doesn’t have any ulterior interests but simply sees itself as the most objective observer of events. All that it wants is its regional stability. Hopefully the world will take note of its stance and follow President Berdimuhamedow’s advice.

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Filed Under: The Express Tribune on Monday 27 September 2021

Why did Imran Khan and Glenn Beck join forces?

Popular conservative broadcaster Glenn Beck recently praised Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan for intervening to assist his private effort to evacuate American civilians and some of their local allies from Afghanistan. The disclosure of their close cooperation on this mission was very symbolic since it showed that those two were able to put aside their many differences in order to join forces for the sake of saving civilians. Beck himself drew attention to this in the statement that he published to Prime Minister Khan. He wrote: “Collectively, we transcended religious differences, political divides, national boundaries and local dynamics – united by shared human dignity, it was a humanitarian effort aimed at saving men, women and children, innocent victims facing certain suffering, hardship or worse if left behind in a war-ravaged country where uncertainty, misunderstanding and suspicion remain prevalent...[Prime Minister Khan’s] leadership of placing humanity before politics is a great example of inter-faith cooperation between the faiths”. Beck and Prime Minister Khan are well known for their Christian and Muslim faiths respectively. In fact, it was due to Beck’s deeply held religious beliefs that he organized this dramatic evacuation mission. He was disgusted by the Biden Administration’s abandonment of fellow Americans and their local allies who’d helped the US military over the past two decades. Beck also believes that the private sector can be much more efficient than the government, which was a political point that he put to the test by trying to save civilians on his own. As for Prime Minister Khan, his deeply held religious beliefs were why he promptly agreed to cooperate with Beck on this ambitious endeavour. Pakistan has done more than any other country when it comes to saving civilians from Afghanistan. Not only did it open its airspace for such missions, but it also hosted many of those who transited through the country en route to their final destination. Nevertheless, Islamabad hasn’t received much public credit for this due to the West’s desire to scapegoat it for the Taliban’s return to power. Beck has a controversial reputation in the West for some of the rather unsavoury comments that he’s previously made about Muslims, to put it mildly, which have led to his critics describing him as an Islamophobe. Whatever one wants to call this conservative commentator, it’s now clear that he’s at the very least open-minded enough to cooperate with a prominent Muslim leader like Prime Minister Khan in pursuit of shared humanitarian interests. This is a development that should be applauded irrespective of Beck’s contentious reputation. In fact, it actually inspires hope if one’s objective enough to think about it. Beck commands enormous influence in many conservative circles that stereotypically aren’t known for being friendly towards Muslims. The very fact that he’d not only work hand-in-hand with Prime Minister Khan on this daring mission but even publicly praise him to the extent that he did should prompt his audience to reconsider their suspicions of Islam and wonder whether maybe they too might have been wrong about this religion and its believers. As for Prime Minister Khan’s international reputation, he’s always been in favour of working with members of other religions and has consistently treated them with respect. Even so, however, Pakistan continues to be perceived by many abroad as a place whose people are hostile towards non-Muslims. Hopefully this false narrative will lose some of its steam after Beck’s praise of Prime Minister Khan’s assistance for his Afghan evacuation mission. Overall, the optics of this unexpected interaction between those two influential figures is that prominent representatives of Christianity and Islam pragmatically joined forces to save civilians from Afghanistan. Whatever one’s opinions about their political and other positions might be, they both deserve praise for successfully pulling this off and setting a powerful example of inter-faith cooperation. It would be in the interests of all that these two continue their cooperation and consider expanding it into other domains. For instance, Beck might be invited to visit Pakistan one of these days in order to see the country that helped him save thousands of people. It would certainly help improve Pakistani-American relations at least in the sphere of public diplomacy if this prominent conservative broadcaster showed his audience what Pakistan and its people are really like, let alone participated in a prospective conference on inter-faith cooperation for example. The Pakistani government should therefore seriously consider this possibility in the future.

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The second amendment and its impact on religious harmony

Whoever has needed to get their Pakistani passport made or renewed may know that in order to start the process, Muslims must, as part of the paperwork, declare Ahmadis non-Muslims. To challenge this bigotry, a Pakistani citizen, Hareem Sumbul, recently set out to appeal to the Passport Office in Lahore to waive this section off from her application form. Her argument, one that I support, is even though Pakistan’s constitution says that Ahmedis are non-Muslims, it does not necessarily mean citizens have to do the same. Why then, are citizens required to fill out a highly discriminatory section within the passport application form? Ahmedis have continuously been under threat in Pakistan since the second amendment was passed in 1974. They face trouble when it comes to acquiring passports and other documents related to identification. Furthermore to hold any governmental office they are supposed to condemn Mirza Ghulam Ahmad- the founder of the Ahmadiyya sect. In addition, they are prohibited from calling themselves Muslims and not allowed to call their place of worship a mosque nor are they allowed to say the first kalma. The anti-Ahmadi influence within Pakistani culture is heavily supported by the legislation, which leads to them being rejected by a majority of the Muslim population. Ahmadis not only face cultural isolation but they are also vulnerable to extremist violence. For example, in addition to many Ahmadis being prosecuted regularly, their mosques in Faisalabad have been attacked in 2018. The most recent attack was earlier this year which left many people dead and injured. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s growing religious polarity and lack of tolerance towards other existing sects and religions has no doubt made the environment around here severely dangerous. Many people, even Sunni Muslims who are perhaps the most protected community in the country are fleeing to other parts of the world in order to build a freer life for themselves. Sumbul has so far been made to run in circles and no positive outcome has come out of her stand till now. Her passport renewal fee was refunded and she was advised to send her passport to Islamabad. She has written necessary emails and we can only hope that she is able to pull something that is not entirely impossible but quite a feat regardless, to get a passport without signing the declaration. It has been done before just last year, with another citizen successfully getting the section cut off from her application before she signed it. In order to prevent the image of Pakistan from being tainted, our government needs to address unfair and discriminatory conditions put on Pakistan’s minority groups while making sure that all of its citizens are treated equally. Pakistan needs to ensure that people are given the freedom to practice their religion, as the Constitution of Pakistan also promises in Article 20. Not only will such moves help our minorities breathe easier but it may also help us gain more respect in he international community.  

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Sowing the seeds of hope in Thar

As I stepped out of the coaster with my colleagues and onto the barren land that is Thar, I knew my perception of the world was about to change. It was surreal to look at the vast expanse of sand, almost glistening under the hot sun. The light brown hues were only interrupted by the vibrant attires of the local women that I could see in the distance. I was standing on the land that I had only seen in textbooks but no picture in the world can prepare you for the stifling, humid heat that hit me as soon as we got there. As we made our way into one of the villages, women, old and young, with veiled faces welcomed us with the most genuine smiles. We were also the object of attention for many of the children, with some downright staring at us, while others laughed, smiled and even waved. Some kids also looked us with suspicious faces, possibly wondering what would be in store for them with the arrival of the people from the big city. It was the summer and I was in the middle of Tharparker for a project called Muhinjo Sohno Thar (‘My Beautiful Thar’, MST), which is using mobile phones to help empower the indigenous people of Thar. As the pandemic hit Thar —a disadvantaged community— saw the halting of necessary migrations, the shirking of the already limited job prospects and the access to food and water, diminishing further. Livestock was also compromised, resulting in a severe food shortage which put pregnant women and children at risk. The resulting financial, emotional and physical challenges also took a toll on the community’s mental health, with at least 143 cases of suicide reported during just the last year.    As I felt the sweat on my brow, I also felt the weight of my privilege and I could not help but become eerily quiet. I had often heard about my colleagues’ experiences but nothing prepares you for Thar till you get there. People had made a life in the middle of nothing. Nursing mothers put their kids to sleep, kids played on the hot sand, birds fluttered about searching for water and people gathered to chit chat about the day. The Thari people don’t have much but they do their best. They make do with the little they have, still reserving the most comfortable shaded spaces of their homes for their guests. Between the resilience of the people and the harsh conditions, my own problems seemed trivial at best. Why did I complain about anything ever? A local lady health worker joined us after we had settled on charpoys. She explained that there are two sets of clothes for the entire year and that women were happy staying in the desert while men travelled to the city in search of jobs. Eventually a very pregnant woman, Geeta, also came to sit with us. I was certain she was given special treatment or help with her tasks owing to her condition but I was wrong. A Thari woman has to work hard every day to survive, no matter what her physical condition. It was therefore even more important to ensure that Thar had internet connectivity under the banner of MST, which in turn has enabled people to connect to affordable healthcare from the comfort of their homes. During our team’s on-ground health awareness sessions, the stark contrast in our lifestyles became even more apparent. Since the start of the pandemic we have heard some messages so often that they have been ingrained in our brains to the point where we think they are universal. When we communicated the importance of washing hands with water for 20 seconds as per WHO’s guidelines, the women asked us for alternatives to water. Many such instances made us stop in our tracks. While we would get temporary respite from the heat in the coaster that was transporting us, I could not help but think how this is the reality for the Tharis. For them, there is no respite and no escape. I wished we could do more for them. Despite social workers coming here, local lady health workers told us there was barely any improvement in the living conditions of the Tharis. Projects are usually oriented by strict timelines, while the problems of Thar are complex and have no short time solutions.  As we traveled to some more villages to conduct interviews about our health interventions, particularly mental health, I realised that through MST we managed to do something unique and unimaginable for many. No matter where they are in the world, human beings are intrinsically the same. Who would have thought that our mental health sessions would get a positive response from the local people? Through MST, our team managed to educate the Thari community on mental health and wellbeing. We trained our community health workers to be trauma-informed and approach Thari women to curb the social isolation they may be facing. The women were first screened for mood disorders and other mental health conditions. Later, clinical psychologists and therapists provided six to eight therapy sessions via the internet. More than half of the target population tested positive for depression, stress, and anxiety. But what changed the equation for us was the winning attitude of these women. They were upfront and vulnerable about their circumstances. There were no excuses, no pretence, only the determination to fully avail an opportunity that would at least change one aspect of their lives. We interviewed several women about how these sessions had impacted them and all of them were over the moon. Like most people, these women just wanted to be seen and heard without the fear of judgment. There was only gratitude that something like this had been possible in their villages. I also felt grateful, because through the programme I met many beautiful people, who fortified my belief in the resilience of human beings. I learned to be open to new experiences and taught me the true value of having dreams. The Thar desert maybe barren but it is not empty and I left it a changed woman. But is change coming fast enough in Thar? No. But change is coming. And we helped sow the seeds for it.

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The long and short of the Single National Curriculum

The Single National Curriculum (SNC) for grades one to five has gotten a lot of attention since the new textbooks were published. Many concerns have been raised about the pictures on the covers, as well as about the actual content inside the textbooks. After going through the textbooks, I’ve come to this conclusion, even though the curriculum has received negative feedback, the books are not as bad as the outcry surrounding them. Yes, the curriculum is definitely not perfect but to deem it an entirely bogus project would not only be unfair but also an ill-informed decision. In my opinion, nothing remotely substantial has come out of Imran Khan’s politics but he may be onto something with this curriculum. Whether or not the SNC will help achieve the objectives Khan has set out to achieve, only time will reveal. Let me also tell you why I am for the curriculum. I believe it is a great initiative to bridge the gap between children from different socio-economic classes and it levels the playing field when it comes to education at least. Having private and public schools along with madrassas teach the same curriculum is, in fact, a rational move. I, however, do not support the move to teach all subjects in Urdu. Children in grades four and five, who were previously studying social studies (now muashrati uloom) in English till now will now be forced to study them in Urdu. Till they get to the sixth grade at least and then back to English. If the objective of this is to ensure that children are fluent in the national language, then steps need to be taken to make sure that the English content being taught is exceptional. Grammatical errors have been common in the previous textbooks from provincial education boards. If such mistakes are still made, an entire generation may be inadept at communicating internationally. We need to give attention to the English language, especially if we want to be better integrated into the world. Another point of contention with the textbooks themselves is, how each chapter starts with Bismillah (in the name of Allah), which would be great if all the children reading the books were Muslim. Incorporating religion into the books really goes against the very foundations on which this country was built. Schools should instead, have separate classes for religious studies that not only include Islam but other religions that are practised in the country as well. This may also lead to a more inclusive society. Interestingly, it is also illegal to force any student to study a religion they do not follow. Article 22 of Pakistan's Constitution states, "Safeguards as to educational institutions in respect of religion, etc. (1) No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own."   Specifically speaking of the imagery and various pictures shown on the textbook covers and inside pages, I would argue that women are shown in different roles and professions, and religions are explored in a positive manner (I know this because I’ve actually gone through the books myself). In addition, good manners and behaviour are emphasised upon, which in my opinion, play an integral part in raising empathic children. As far as women’s dressing is portrayed in the books, let me tell you that there is an equal number of girls in headscarves and without, which is simply a fair representation of the Pakistani culture. Many young girls don the headscarf from a very young age as part of the country's culture.   Perhaps what Punjab needs to focus on at this time is to ensure that the SNC is sustainable. They need to put a proper training system in place for teachers, principals and deans that teaches them how to not only tackle the new curriculum but also how to deal with the problems students may face. Unless an organised system is put in place to prepare registered, certified teachers, the chances of our education system becoming stronger are very slim. I’m certain there are plenty of issues that can and need to be addressed about the new textbooks and perhaps introducing a new curriculum at this point in time may have been a bit selfish on PTI's part but we can hope for the sake of our children that the SNC will be executed in good faith.

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Filed Under: The Express Tribune on Thursday 16 September 2021

How significant was the reported Islamabad intelligence summit?

Reports circulated over the weekend that Islamabad hosted an unprecedented summit of regional intelligence chiefs. The Russian, Chinese, Iranian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, and Tajik ones allegedly participated in this gathering. None of these countries have confirmed this meeting at the time of writing but nor have they denied it either. It thus appears as though these reports have some degree of credibility to them and should therefore be taken seriously. If that’s the case as it seems to be, then this event would have been extremely significant. Pakistan is the most influential regional stakeholder in Afghanistan and is closer to the Taliban than anyone else. It therefore has a responsibility to help its fellow stakeholders better understand the evolving strategic situation there. That’s especially the case since others like Russia officially regard the group as terrorists even though the Kremlin still pragmatically engages with it in the interests of peace and security. Pakistan’s decades-long insight into the Taliban and Afghanistan more generally is of unparalleled importance to its partners. Pakistan, China, and Russia are the three countries most actively interacting with the Taliban. Iran’s position is complicated since it also acknowledges the group’s de facto leadership of Afghanistan but recently criticised its Panjshir operation in pretty harsh terms. The Central Asian Republics (CARs) with the exception of Tajikistan are following the first three mentioned countries’ leads while Dushanbe remains opposed to the Taliban, though not yet in any regionally destabilising way such as by supporting anti-Taliban groups. Tajikistan’s concerns stem from two factors: its kindred ties with ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan which are that country’s second largest minority and have historically been opposed to the Pashtun-majority Taliban’s rule; and the state’s strictly secular system which naturally makes it ideologically opposed to the Islamic group. These interests make that country the only outlier among its fellow stakeholders but its mutual defence alliance with Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) means that Moscow might help manage it. Their respective relations with the Taliban can therefore be simplified as follows: Pakistan, China, and Russia have the most influence over the group and behave the most pragmatically towards it; Iran is playing a double game as is typical per its diplomatic traditions; the CARs for the most part are non-factors in shaping the course of events in Afghanistan; while Tajikistan could potentially become a troublemaker. Islamabad’s interests naturally rest in aligning their positions so that they can most effectively respond to this new regional reality. For perhaps the first time in its history, Pakistan has globally significant influence since some of the most important countries in the world such as China and Russia are looking to it for leadership in helping Afghanistan’s stakeholders jointly manage the new state of affairs in the interconnected Central-South Asian space that concerns them all. Their intelligence chiefs reportedly agreed to gather in Islamabad at their host’s invitation because they tacitly acknowledge that country’s newfound leading role in shaping the future. Pakistan was proven right by recent events in Afghanistan after having consistently supported the Taliban’s participation in the political process there. For a while, it was the only country in the world with this position, which eventually became the global norm after the group was invited to travel to Russia, China, and Iran for peace talks and ultimately signed its February 2020 deal with the US. The reality in which everyone is now operating was therefore first envisioned by Pakistan, which has the most experience planning for this scenario. The South Asian state also unveiled a new multipolar grand strategy in March during the inaugural Islamabad Security Dialogue that’s perfectly suited for accommodating all stakeholders’ strategic interests. Pakistan informally regards itself as the “Zipper of Eurasia” for connecting the supercontinent’s various regional integration blocs, which when combined with its hosting of the Belt & Road Initiative’s (BRI) flagship project of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its expansions (CPEC+), could make it the “Global Pivot State”. In practical terms, Pakistan envisions February’s agreement for a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan (PAKAFUZ) railway functioning as the war-torn state’s economic jugular for sustainably rebuilding its economy. It would also enable Russia to finally fulfill its centuries-long goal of reaching the Indian Ocean. In addition, China could reach its new 25-year strategic partners in Iran by pioneering a “Persian Corridor” through Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This vision is mutually beneficial and satisfies all stakeholders’ geo-economic interests. Sceptics dismissed this as political fantasy up until the Taliban seized power and turned this scenario into the most likely regional reality. It can’t be known for sure, but Pakistan might have taken the opportunity afforded to it by the reported intelligence summit in Islamabad to brief its counterparts on this vision in an attempt to assess their respective will to jointly implement it. The country would also have suggested practical means for them all to contribute to ensuring Afghanistan’s security in both the soft and hard dimensions. Regarding the first, China is already emerging as the champion in this regard after promising $31 million of aid to the country to help mitigate its colossal socio-economic challenges. It’s not a lot in the grand scheme of things but is a positive step in the right direction that could inspire others like Russia to follow suit, after which Iran and the CARs (with the exception of Tajikistan which requires its own aid to deal with the refugee crisis) might do so as well through their own modest means. Concerning the second, hard security is already being ensured through Russia’s proactive efforts to coordinate its Central Asian allies’ response to Afghan-emanating threats such as ISIS-K and large-scale refugee waves that could be exploited as so-called “Weapons of Mass Migration”. Pakistan has also fenced off most of its border with Afghanistan and built many forts along it. As for Iran, it too is doing its utmost to prevent the spillover of Afghan-emanating threats but everyone’s efforts would be improved if they coordinated them through the SCO. Speaking of which, that organisation’s heads of state summit will be held in Dushanbe later this week from 16-17 September. It might turn out to be the case that the reported intelligence summit in Islamabad results in the pertinent countries agreeing to certain suggestions for jointly managing Afghanistan’s soft and hard security, though of course only if Russia can succeed in preventing its Indian ally from undermining these efforts in pursuit of its zero-sum interests at their collective expense. In any case, the reported summit was significant because it symbolised Pakistan’s newfound geostrategic importance in shaping the future of Eurasia after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. Islamabad’s close ties to the group, its regional connectivity vision, and its multifaceted soft & hard security experiences are all extremely useful to its fellow stakeholders who are now following its lead in adapting to this new regional reality. The reported summit thus signified Pakistan’s rise as a regional power that can no longer be ignored.

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Pakistan’s ambivalent economic outlook

Pakistan’s economy is witnessing a swift changeover courtesy of Shaukat Tarin. The government has shifted gears from stabilisation to growth by adopting expansionary policies. It hoped to induce sustainable growth on the premise of having rectified the underlying economic botches like a managed rupee, an ineffective monetary watchdog (State Bank of Pakistan), etc. However, the initial economic results from the on-going fiscal year are stirring a feeling of déjà vu. The import bill has swelled to over $12 billion in the months of July and August and culminated in a $7.5 billion trade deficit. Resultantly, the rupee fell against the dollar to over Rs. 168 per US dollar and is likely to surpass its record high of $1 = Rs. 168.43. History is repeating itself as the uptick in exports has been rather subdued in comparison to imports which are soaring. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan is reliant on imported energies like Crude Oil (Brent) and LNG. And, to Pakistan’s disadvantage, the price of both of these fuels is surging internationally. So, no matter what else is done, Pakistan will face the brunt of a sizable trade gap and recurring boom-bust cycles until and unless it limits its dependence on these imported commodities. The demand for Crude Oil (Brent) and LNG is to meet petroleum and energy needs. Pakistan has an energy mix skewed heavily towards fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), followed by hydropower and other renewable sources. Fossil fuels inflict considerable damage to the environment and Pakistan, highly vulnerable to climate change, cannot afford to sustain the present energy composition. Hence, it becomes imperative to rearrange the contemporary composition of the energy mix and lean more towards hydro, wind, solar, and other renewable energies. The southern half of Pakistan is suited for solar energy with hot, sunny summers. At the same time, wind power has immense potential since the country has several areas with express wind speed. Besides, Pakistan needs to expedite the implementation of the electric vehicle (EV) policy. The other way to resolve the plight at hand is by transforming exporting industries. Pakistan has never been able to realise its exporting potential in the wake of poor research and development (R&D) spending which led to little or no innovation. This meant that the production, be it industrial or agricultural, continues to be labour-intensive with an appalling productivity ratio. Similarly, the exports are mostly textile related. So, there is a lack of diversity and we are expecting a bit too much from the textile industry which has to compete against the likes of Bangladesh and Vietnam despite paying for exorbitant energy compared to these counterparts. The good part is that the remittances have spiralled to $5.36 billion in the 2MFY22 against $4.86 billion in the same period last year. This settles the nerves of citizens who are alarmed at the deteriorating trade balance and, consequently, current account deficit (CAD). The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is faced with a catch 22 where it can either amass foreign exchange reserves or hold the free fall of the PKR by using the forex to manage the exchange. Contrary to its conduct in the past, the SBP does not seem interested in artificially holding the rupee. This has augmented the country’s total liquid foreign reserves to $27.1 billion. However, Pakistan is likely to face a difficult time trying to circumvent imported inflation. Inflation has a paramount trickle-down impact and is already making the government mull upon non-economic and irrational ways like monitoring prices of basic commodities. This may lead to short-term political gain but will disrupt how markets operate and is likely to trigger a shortage or an excess in the market. Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI)’s government will post a handsome growth number, but will it take care of CAD and reserves is the question looming over the minds of stakeholders. If it’s unable to prevent another bust, Pakistan will be back to square one and the Shaukat Tarin experiment will prove to be Imran Khan's biggest mistake on the economic front.

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What did the Pakistani ambassador to Moscow say to Russian media?

Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Shafqat Ali Khan was interviewed by Russia’s publicly financed international media outlets Sputnik and TASS, which reported on his comments in five separate articles here, here, here, here, and here. For the sake of those interested observers with limited time to follow all of this, especially if they’re understandably paying more attention to what’s happening in Afghanistan right now, the present piece will highlight the main points from his interviews and then briefly analyse their significance. Here are the most important policy pronouncements shared by Ambassador Khan followed by the author’s interpretation: “Our relations are truly in a very strong position today, we have relationship based on trust which covers a wide area of cooperation: economy, politics, defence cooperation. Both sides are satisfied at the positive direction of our relations. This is a key priority of Pakistan’s foreign policy. And Russian friends who follow Pakistan know it is across all political parties, it is a common point that we want good relations with Russia. You can see that - the groundswell of positive opinion about Russia in Pakistan. And it is not an exaggeration.” The rapid Russian-Pakistani rapprochement continues to proceed apace and is nowadays diversifying into other sectors than the defence one that originally brought them back together in 2014. Islamabad priorities ties with Moscow because it appreciates the Eurasian Great Power’s rising role in balancing the supercontinent’s affairs. There’s political unanimity on this front inside of Pakistan and this vision is genuinely popular with the Pakistani people too. “In April, [Russian] Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Islamabad, it was a very successful visit. And then recently the two ministers spoke on telephone. Then President [of Russia Vladimir] Putin and Prime Minister [of Pakistan Imran Khan] spoke. There are some other visits in the pipeline at the senior level, but I cannot confirm because the dates are not confirmed yet.” Ties will further develop following the planned visits that Ambassador Khan hinted at. It can only be speculated who’ll go where and when, but either way, it’s a positive sign that their governments are getting to know and therefore trust one another better. Well-wishers can only hope that closer people-to-people ties will eventually follow sometime in the future in order to add more robustness to bilateral relations. “[The Extended Troika] is the fundamental forum, which is Pakistan, Russia, China, and the United States. That remains the key part of everything. And then, of course, we also have the Moscow format, which is more expanded, with more countries involved. And then, of course, there is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [that] also has been involved here.” The three primary platforms within which Russia and Pakistan closely coordinate on Afghanistan are the Extended Troika, the Moscow peace talks, and the SCO. This shows how serious these top two regional stakeholders in Afghanistan’s stability are about jointly supporting that third country and getting their institutional partners to constructively contribute to this as well. “About India’s joining, I have not seen the statement. There is a standing invitation for Iran to join the Troika Plus whenever it wants. So far, they have not taken a decision to join it ... They have so far not responded, conveyed their interest in joining. But I haven’t seen Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statement that says that India will join the Troika plus format. For us, India is not a candidate for Troika plus.” One point of divergence between Russia and Pakistan regarding their regional vision is Moscow’s belief that India should play a greater role in the Extended Troika, which Islamabad believes isn’t necessary. It’s natural that no set of partners will ever perfectly see eye to eye with one another on everything, and this issue likely won’t impede the steady growth of their relations though since bilateral ties are solid enough to prevent that. “There has been discussion going on (about Pakistan’s suggestion to hold a meeting between foreign ministers of regional countries to discuss Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Taliban taking over Kabul), but there is nothing concrete yet as such in terms of who will be the participants, when it will take [place], whether the place is confirmed. I don’t have any information to share on that. But what I can tell you is there are some ideas about that. No concrete details yet.” Pakistan continues to take the lead in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by attempting to assemble all responsible stakeholders that are concerned about that country’s future. These plans understandably take some time to organise, especially considering how busy their respective representatives are nowadays in dealing with this issue, but it’s indeed possible that something positive will eventually come out of these efforts. Should the meeting be held, then it’ll further strengthen Russian-Pakistani ties too. “So it’s not that we have a kind of a control over Afghanistan, but geography, culture, history, and, of course, language and the fact that there are four million refugees living in Pakistan. That gives us some kind of a role, but not control over a situation. The solution and dealing with the challenge is a collective responsibility.” Despite having very close ties with the Afghan people across all levels, Pakistan doesn’t “control” them nor the Taliban like some observers have falsely claimed. Islamabad can exert positive influence over some processes, but it cannot completely shape them, nor does it aspire to because the solutions should be multilateral. “But we are not in the position to tell them exactly what to do. To us the process of reaching a settlement should not be important, for us the outcome should be important. There should be an inclusive government which would help Afghanistan finally arrive at a peaceful outcome.” Pakistan pragmatically takes the stance that the outcome of Afghan stability – ideally through the eventual formation of an inclusive government – is more important than the process through which this is achieved. This signifies Islamabad’s sincere respect for its neighbour’s historical socio-political traditions. “Our point is that it is going to be a problem because there is a limit to how much (refugees) we can take. If there are too many refugees from Afghanistan, we will be the most affected but there will be other countries affected. The refugees will go to Iran, Europe, Central Asia. To solve this, you try to work out a political settlement in Afghanistan.” One of Pakistan’s goals in assembling all responsible stakeholders on Afghanistan is to multilaterally deal with the scenario of a regional refugee crisis. The South Asian state can’t absorb any more refugees after already hosting several million of them, which is why it’s important for everyone else to step up and proactively promote a sustainable political settlement in Afghanistan so as to address the root causes for migration. “I hope [that it is] not [NATO attempting to shift all responsibility for Afghanistan on Pakistan] because western countries understand that the withdrawal of forces does not mean that they have washed their hands. They can’t. Refugees are just one manifestation. There can be darker consequences: drugs, human smuggling, narcotics, terrorism.” The regional security situation is extremely sensitive right now and will accordingly require multilateral coordination to effectively address. Unconventional threats abound beyond the realm of refugees so it’s important for everyone to work together to prevent the worst-case scenarios from transpiring. Pakistan will take the lead in these respects, but it can only succeed in close coordination with its partners. “And finally, one last point is that some foreign powers may think that it is only Pakistan’s problem. No, it’s not just our problem. Tomorrow a person fighting against Pakistan can join ISIS* and start attacking others. So overall, this problem has to be rooted out. But the key, one first step, is stability in Afghanistan for that.” Amb. Khan felt it necessary to emphasise how his country cannot be expected to deal with these unconventional threats on its own. The contemporary regional security matrix is such that while Pakistan might be the first victim of such threats, it surely won’t be the last so it’s in everyone’s interests to work together now. “I will not talk about procurement issues at this point of time because that is a sensitive matter. There is a legal foundation for defense cooperation: we have the main agreement, there are some other agreements and yet some more agreements are under negotiation between the two sides. As they complete we will tell you. So far, we have been historically importing in aviation sector, and also in terms of helicopters. So, there is already a long tradition of working with the Russian defense industry. But I think it will get much richer in the years ahead.” The Kremlin acutely understands Pakistan’s unconventional security needs and is therefore working to expand relevant military-technical cooperation as part of their joint efforts to stabilise the uncertain regional situation. This speaks to Russia’s confidence in practicing a much more balanced policy towards South Asia than in years past where it neglected legitimate Pakistani security interests due to its narrow focus on its Indian ally’s interests. Moscow has evidently realised that its “military diplomacy” isn’t a zero-sum game but can be mutually beneficial for all since ensuring Pakistan’s unconventional security stabilises South Asia as a whole. “Two rounds of commercial discussions have taken place (on the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline) and both sides are very satisfied with the progress achieved so far. I don’t know the details but the bulk of that is clear. Once they finish it, and then of course the date will come up for the start of construction. But we are very close to that.” Bilateral relations with Russia have veritably expanded beyond the Afghan-related political and defensive fields to include strategic energy cooperation through the impending construction of the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline, which will serve as the flagship project of Russian-Pakistani economic ties. “Ten million doses of Sputnik V we are going to get from Russia...Just few days back our authorities announced that the first one million doses of Russian vaccine Sputnik V are already there...We have made our interest known (in producing Sputnik V), the two technical sides are talking to each other, but right now the priority was procurement...And I think we were one of the first embassies where everyone got it and frankly it saved all of us from any trouble.” Building upon the preceding observation above, bilateral relations are now rapidly expanding into the epidemiological sphere that directly affects people’s lives. Pakistan is becoming a major procurer of Sputnik V and intends to hopefully produce some of this treatment too. It’s also important to point out that the Pakistani Embassy in Russia was one of the first to receive Sputnik V too since this shows just how much Islamabad trusts Moscow that it would prioritise its diplomats taking this vaccine before most other countries’ there did. Ambassador Khan’s interviews were extremely important because they clarified Pakistan’s stance towards the rapidly unfolding events in Afghanistan and were also an up-to-date assessment of bilateral relations with Russia. Russian-Pakistani ties continue to strengthen and expand into multiple domains, be they multilateral one regarding joint efforts to stabilise Afghanistan or the energy and epidemiological ones that stand to most immediately improve the Pakistani people’s lives. It’s time for observers the world over to wake up and realise that the Russian-Pakistani partnership is among the most promising ones in modern-day Eurasia.

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Who does and does not support the Taliban in Afghanistan?

The Taliban victory would not have been possible without (some degree of) popular support. No neighbouring country can sustain an insurgency for 20 years, especially against the U.S. and its NATO allies, unless the insurgents have a support base inside their own country. That being said, like every politico-military group, the Taliban too have their opponents. Below, this writing will look at who supports and who does not support the Taliban in Afghanistan. Shared ethnicity as a source of the Taliban’s support To begin with, we must look at two things, ethnicity and ideology, to find out who supports the Taliban. First, from an ethnic point of view, the Taliban are a predominantly ethnic Pashtun group; from its leadership down to its fighters, the group is dominated by the Pashtuns. Among the Pashtuns, the Durrani tribes of southern and southwestern Afghanistan dominate the Taliban rank and file, and thus the Taliban have more support within the Durrani tribes, with the exception of the Achakzais, than outside of them. Additionally, after the veteran Mujahedin fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani (from the Zadran tribe) cast his lot with the Taliban, some Zadrans of south eastern Afghanistan have also become Taliban supporters. However, since the Pashtuns are divided into tribes, sub-tribes, and clans, and oftentimes there are fierce rivalries and competition between Pashtun tribes and clans, it would be an overstatement to say the Taliban represent all the Pashtuns. In recent years, the Taliban have also made inroads among non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Capitalising on grievances—including against the Afghan government, drug trafficking, and local rivalries, the Taliban have brought many non-Pashtun local commanders in northern Afghanistan under their umbrella. That being said, the Pashtuns continue to form the bulk of the Taliban rank and file, and, as an ethnic group, seem to have more sympathy with the Taliban than non-Pashtun ethnic groups, especially the Shia Hazaras of central Afghanistan. Shared ideology as a source of the Taliban’s support From the point of view of ideology, much of Afghanistan is a fertile ground for the Taliban’s extremist and misogynist ideology to bloom. It is on the basis of ideology that the Taliban have more popular support across Afghanistan (and across ethnic and linguistic groups) than on any other basis. Since the 1978 communist coup in Kabul, Afghans have received a steady dose of religious extremist literature, which makes it easier for them to accept and embrace the Taliban. For instance, when topics such as suicide bombings came up in my conversations with Afghans from various walks of life (including fellow students from Kabul University), many either indirectly supported these tactics or looked the other way as long as only foreigners were targeted. If you had no other option against well-armed invaders, you could resort to suicide bombings as a last resort provided no innocent Afghans were killed, was the final verdict of such conversations. Similarly, many Afghans who regularly indulged in corruption did so thinking and proclaiming that they were squandering the infidels’ money. Taking verses from the Qur'an out of context, it was regularly taught in schools and universities, including at Kabul University’s School of Law and Political Science where I studied, that Christians and Jews could never be our friends. Ironically, the U.S. and World Bank assisted with paying the salaries of Afghan school teachers and university professors, who in turn propagated hatred towards Christians and Jews. Moreover, one could categorise the Afghan society as misogynist, including by Islamic standards. Discrimination against girls starts before their birth—a practice strictly prohibited by Islam. When a woman is pregnant, the family prefers the future baby to be a boy. Mothers who give birth to girls are frowned upon, and are sometimes subjected to verbal abuse and physical violence. Under pressure, it is not uncommon for Afghan women to keep conceiving until a boy is born. Women who have one son make multiple attempts at pregnancy to have at least two. When girls are born, families treat such occasions with either sadness or indifference. As children, girls are expected to do chores and boys are discouraged (directly or indirectly) from doing so. A sister is supposed to cook, wash, and clean the house for her brother and other family members, while the brother may not even bother rinsing his tea cup. In most rural areas and partly in cities as well, girls are discouraged to study beyond grade four or five, as they are expected to get married once they hit puberty. It is a common practice in many parts of Afghanistan that when a man and a woman, especially a husband and a wife, step outside the house “together,” the man walks a meter or so ahead of the woman, who is usually in chadari (the garment that covers women from head to toe), so that he is not seen by the public walking with a woman. Furthermore, we as Muslims know the names of our Prophet’s mother, daughters, wives, and other relatives. However, in Afghanistan it is a social taboo to make mention of one’s female family member’s name. Many Afghan men refer to their wives as their “baggage.” The Afghan society’s overall perception of the status of girls and women is not too different from that of the Taliban. As such, if the Taliban were to make wearing the chadari compulsory again, few (who primarily live in cities and in some cases have either come from abroad or have gone abroad) would object to it. The majority of Afghans would accept the ruling without any major fuss. The Taliban’s Afghan opponents Those who oppose the Taliban are the urban and western-oriented Afghans, who are mainly based in cities such as Kabul, Herat, and Mazar. The anti-Taliban urban Afghans, however, are vastly outnumbered by the conservative rural Afghans, who form the Taliban's support base. In a country, such as Afghanistan, where the majority of the population lives in rural areas, it should be clear which side holds the advantage. It was in urban Afghans, who mostly resided in the “Kabul Bubble,” that the U.S. made a fragile investment over the last 20 years. Ironically, some of these urbanites, who actually had come from abroad and did not even know Afghanistan's official languages, would declare themselves as "representatives of modern Afghanistan.” Most members of the so-called Kabul Bubble did not dare visit rural Afghanistan, which they falsely purported to represent. Even inside the Kabul Bubble, many had their own mini bubbles, where they rarely interacted with those outside their bubbles, and were escorted everywhere by a security detail. Thus, the anti-Taliban, western-oriented Afghans' perception of facts on the ground could not have been more clouded; they lived in their own separate world. When things started to unravel in July and early to mid-August, at first they were surprised and could not believe what was unfolding before their eyes. Once a bit of the truth sank in, thousands—making a nonsense of their being modern Afghanistan's representatives—started rushing to the Kabul airport to catch the first available plane to the safety of western world. This is precisely why many urban-based Afghan singers, artists, and self-styled women’s rights activists are accusing the U.S. of abandoning them, and throwing them to the wolves. That being said, there were certainly also well-meaning anti-Taliban urban Afghans (including a considerable number of ethnic Pashtuns) who had not come from abroad. They did not live in security bubbles, and did want Afghanistan to progress genuinely. Additionally, rural Hazaras and other non-Sunni Muslims across Afghanistan did not support the Taliban either. Yet, these Afghans, too, were a progressive minority within a largely conservative, and at times reactionary, society. One could also employ the 14th century Muslim sociologist Ibn Khaldun’s theory on desert civilisation (rural) vs. sedentary (settled) civilisation to explain the current Afghan rural-urban divide, which favours the Taliban. I will leave that arena to anthropologists to explore further. In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that claims such as the Taliban do not represent Afghanistan could not be further from the truth. The Taliban do represent much of Afghanistan the way it is, without putting a façade on it to make appealing to western audiences. If the Taliban, unlike the well-educated and well-learned scholars of Islam at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, hold extremist and misogynistic views it is because they are a direct product of the semi-literate, rural Afghan society, which holds the same views. The Afghans’ (and by extension as well as the Taliban’s) outlook on life is more influenced by their culture than by Islam.

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Should the US rely on the Taliban instead of airstrikes to fight ISIS-K?

The US is increasingly concerned about the growing capabilities of the ISIS-K terrorist group after last week’s attack at the Kabul Airport. It’s since launched two separate strikes against its members, the first of which was against some of that attack’s alleged organisers while the second was in downtown Kabul and targeted a terrorist that was reportedly on his way to carry out another suicide attack at the airport. That second strike, however, ended up killing nine members of a single family according to reports. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told China’s CGTN on Monday that these strikes were “illegal” and “arbitrary”, suggesting instead that “the US should have reported it to us, rather than conduct an arbitrary attack that has resulted in civilian casualties.” That’s a sensible proposal too since US President Joe Biden told Americans last Thursday that ISIS-K is “an arch-enemy of the Taliban” and that his country even passed along the names of Americans traveling to the Kabul Airport to the Taliban so that they could pass their checkpoints. The American leader earlier clarified in his speech that he doesn’t trust the Taliban but is relying on its “self-interest” in ensuring that “ISIS-K does not metastasize beyond what it is, number one. And number two, it’s in their interest that we are able to leave on time, on target.” This is an accurate reflection of current US-Taliban relations, but that makes it all the more curious why Biden didn’t want to outsource his country’s latest anti-ISIS-K operations to the Taliban. It seems to be the case at least at this sensitive point in time so shortly after last week’s terrorist attack that the US wants to show its people that it’s “leading from the front” when it comes to carrying retributive operations against ISIS-K. After all, Biden also told the American people during Thursday’s speech that “We will respond with force and precision at our time, at the place we choose, and the moment of our choosing.” He therefore couldn’t depend on the Taliban for that before the withdrawal ends without provoking another scandal. Looking forward, however, Russian Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov warned that more American strikes in Afghanistan “should not be ruled out” while speaking to the press on Monday. He didn’t directly say so, but it can be interpreted that he might have sought to imply that the US could exploit ISIS-K as a pretext for carrying out more attacks there, perhaps to boost Biden’s plummeting approval rating ahead of next year’s midterms by distracting from his disastrous withdrawal. That scenario could arguably prove destabilising. In terms of the bigger picture, it would be best for the US to share its intelligence about ISIS-K with the Taliban. America of course has domestic soft power interests in flexing its anti-terrorist capabilities in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, especially those self-interested ones related to improving Biden’s popularity at home, but it’s better for it to respect the Taliban’s de facto leadership over Afghanistan if there’s ever to be any hope for a meaningful rapprochement between these hated enemies. The Taliban doesn’t want any problems with the US after it finally leaves Afghanistan. In fact, it would prefer for America to reconstruct the country as a form of reparations. Washington has an interest in doing this because it hopes that February’s agreement to construct a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan (PAKAFUZ) railway with its three “New Quad” partners will help it geo-strategically reshape the region by expanding its economic influence through post-withdrawal Afghanistan to the Central Asian Republics. For that to happen, though, the US must first recognise Afghanistan’s de facto Taliban-led government as legitimate. That hasn’t yet occurred for two primary reasons. Firstly, it’s too domestically sensitive of an issue immediately after the US’ disastrous withdrawal, and secondly because it hopes to use this as an incentive for the Taliban to keep its prior promises to cut ties with international terrorist groups, assemble an inclusive government, and respect minorities’ and women’s rights. If the US continues bombing ISIS-K, however, then it’ll make it more difficult for the Taliban to agree to the formal establishment of bilateral relations. The group would regard this as a slap in the face of its sovereignty claims, especially after its latest statement. It can’t be seen as desperate to enter into official ties with the US, nor does it actually even need to do so anyhow. The Taliban hopes to receive much-needed economic, financial, and investment aid from China, Russia, and others that can potentially compensate for US aid. Still, it’s best for everyone that the US and the Taliban enjoy pragmatic relations sometime in the future focused on their shared security and development interests. Not doing so could dangerously lead to the scenario wherein the US continues bombing Afghanistan under the ISIS-K pretext but ends up “coincidentally” targeting Chinese, Russian, or other countries’ investments there. It’s those countries that rely more on their new partner’s connectivity and mineral prospects than the US, which can indefinitely wait to utilise PAKAFUZ. China, Russia, and others, however, have a more pressing interest in reconstructing Afghanistan than the US does. America might only stop bombing ISIS-K on its own terms, not the Taliban’s, whatever they might ultimately end up being. Speculatively speaking, these might include preferential reconstruction and mineral extraction contracts for its companies in order to gain an edge over their Chinese, Russian, and other competitors. Only then might the US completely outsource its anti-ISIS-K operations to the Taliban. The only possible scenario that could offset the one that was just described above is if China, Russia, and/or others reverse their current designation of the Taliban as terrorists by recognising them as Afghanistan’s legitimate authorities before the US does and then provide the country with anti-air capabilities for deterring these attacks. That, however, doesn’t appear to be realistic since there’s still a palpable fear among the international community about the Taliban’s grand strategic intentions and whether they’ve truly changed. For these reasons, Mr. Kabulov’s warning about more American strikes against Afghanistan will probably come to pass even though it remains to be seen how regularly it’ll strike that country and whether it’ll even do so for legitimate anti-terrorist reasons. The US isn’t likely to completely outsource its anti-ISIS-K operations to the Taliban until it gets something tangible in return, though it’s unclear exactly what that might be. All that can be hoped for until then is that the US doesn’t kill too many civilians or targets other countries’ investments.

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The Khan-Putin call is a defining moment in Pak-Russian relations

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to call Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan on Wednesday was a defining moment in their countries’ bilateral relations, which have been rapidly improving over the past few years. According to the Kremlin’s official readout of the call: “While discussing the situation in Afghanistan, both sides stressed the importance of maintaining peace and security in the country, preventing violence and establishing an inter-Afghan dialogue that would facilitate the formation of an inclusive government that takes into account the interests of all segments of the population. It was agreed to coordinate approaches to the Afghan issue both in bilateral and multilateral formats. At the same time, it was noted that it would be appropriate to use the capabilities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in ensuring regional stability and the fight against terrorism and the drug threat. The parties touched upon several topics on the bilateral agenda, including the development of trade and economic ties, and the implementation of joint projects in the energy and humanitarian spheres. Russian-Pakistani contacts at various levels will be intensified.” This represents the first-ever tacit acknowledgment that Russia has come to rely on Pakistan to advance its interests, which in this context relate to stabilising Afghanistan after the Taliban’s lightning-fast takeover earlier this month. This suggests that their developing partnership has finally begun to take on strategic dimensions. The Afghan Crisis is arguably the top one in the world right now, but it’s only Pakistan and Russia that have any realistic chance to shape events in that country through their respective ties with the Taliban. Islamabad’s ones are well-known and cultivated over the decades while Moscow’s are relatively new and explained at length in my latest analysis for the Russian International Affairs Council titled “Russia & The Taliban: From Narrative Challenges To Opportunities”. In short, one of the largely overlooked outcomes of the recent Russian-Pakistani partnership was Islamabad facilitating Moscow’s ties with the same group that the Kremlin still officially regards as terrorists but with whom it’s nevertheless pragmatically engaging in the interests of regional peace and security. The Eurasian Great Power considers the Taliban to be an anti-ISIS bulwark and hopes that it’ll stabilise Afghanistan as soon as possible so as to unlock its trans-regional connectivity potential and estimated $3 trillion worth of minerals. The first-mentioned objective refers to February’s agreement to build the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan (PAKAFUZ) railway that Russia can then utilise to finally reach the Indian Ocean like it’s aimed to do for centuries already. As for the second, it wouldn’t just enrich Russia, but would provide much-needed revenue for the Taliban to redistribute throughout its impoverished society and reinvest in reconstructing Afghanistan. These objectives are mutually beneficial and complementary, hence why they’re being prioritised. They can’t be accomplished without Pakistan’s support, however, though Islamabad obviously shares their aims. The South Asian state wants to utilise PAKAFUZ in order to serve as the Central Asian Republic’s (CARs) access point to the global marketplace and also hopes for Afghanistan to sustainably rebuild itself after the war finally ends. The influence that Pakistan and Russia nowadays have with the Taliban can ideally be leveraged to facilitate the group’s goal of assembling an inclusive government and ensuring that it cuts its ties with terrorists. Such an outcome wouldn’t be the end point of the Russian-Pakistani partnership, but the beginning of the entirely new era of bilateral relations that they’re both striving towards. Russia aspires to incorporate Pakistan into its Greater Eurasian Partnership, to which end Afghanistan must first be stabilised and PAKAFUZ constructed. Upon those interconnected objectives being met, Moscow can then diversify economic ties with Islamabad beyond their Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline flagship project and into the commercial sphere. For this to happen, Russia and Pakistan must work more closely than ever before in putting their influence with the Taliban to good use, which explains why President Putin initiated his call with Prime Minister Khan. This symbolically showed that Moscow is deferring to Islamabad’s expertise in this field in order to increase the chances of unlocking the mutual opportunities that they hope to tap into via Kabul. It also symbolically shows that these two former rivals have truly put the past behind them and are ready to chart a new future together. Not only that, but it’s important to point out that President Putin called Prime Minister Khan before US President Joe Biden did, who has yet to talk to the Pakistani leader despite the South Asian state nominally being a so-called “Major Non-Nato Ally” and indispensable to America’s evacuation from Afghanistan. The Russian leader therefore showed that he respects his Pakistani counterpart much more than his American one does, which signifies just how seriously the strategic dynamics are shifting in South Asia. Nevertheless, Russian-Indian relations still remain strong since President Putin spoke to Prime Minister Narendra Modi the day before calling his Pakistani counterpart so nobody should speculate that there will be any worsening of their ties as a result of the latest development. Rather, Russia is simply showing the world that it’s truly restored balance to its South Asian strategy, which builds upon the new model of regional engagement pioneered in April after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid his first trip to Pakistan in 9 years. Russia has indisputably returned to South Asia ever since the start of the year, and in a more balanced way than ever before. While India will still remain the Kremlin’s top partner there, Pakistan will no longer be neglected like in the past. In fact, Russia nowadays needs Pakistan in order to advance its regional interests which finally align with Islamabad’s own, particularly in Afghanistan. Their mutual embrace of geo-economics has made their respective grand strategies of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and CPEC+ complementary through PAKAFUZ. Considering the context in which President Putin initiated his call to Prime Minister Khan, which includes not just the Afghan Crisis in general but also Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s ongoing tour to each of Afghanistan’s neighbours apart from China, there’s no question that Russia nowadays relies on close coordination with Pakistan for achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan. This observation marks a defining moment in their relations and shows that they’ve finally begun to take on strategic dimensions.

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