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Who does and does not support the Taliban in Afghanistan?
The Taliban victory would not have been possible without (some degree of) popular support. No neighbouring country can sustain an insurgency for 20 years, especially against the U.S. and its NATO allies, unless the insurgents have a support base inside their own country. That being said, like every politico-military group, the Taliban too have their opponents. Below, this writing will look at who supports and who does not support the Taliban in Afghanistan. Shared ethnicity as a source of the Taliban’s support To begin with, we must look at two things, ethnicity and ideology, to find out who supports the Taliban. First, from an ethnic point of view, the Taliban are a predominantly ethnic Pashtun group; from its leadership down to its fighters, the group is dominated by the Pashtuns. Among the Pashtuns, the Durrani tribes of southern and southwestern Afghanistan dominate the Taliban rank and file, and thus the Taliban have more support within the Durrani tribes, with the exception of the Achakzais, than outside of them. Additionally, after the veteran Mujahedin fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani (from the Zadran tribe) cast his lot with the Taliban, some Zadrans of south eastern Afghanistan have also become Taliban supporters. However, since the Pashtuns are divided into tribes, sub-tribes, and clans, and oftentimes there are fierce rivalries and competition between Pashtun tribes and clans, it would be an overstatement to say the Taliban represent all the Pashtuns. In recent years, the Taliban have also made inroads among non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Capitalising on grievances—including against the Afghan government, drug trafficking, and local rivalries, the Taliban have brought many non-Pashtun local commanders in northern Afghanistan under their umbrella. That being said, the Pashtuns continue to form the bulk of the Taliban rank and file, and, as an ethnic group, seem to have more sympathy with the Taliban than non-Pashtun ethnic groups, especially the Shia Hazaras of central Afghanistan. Shared ideology as a source of the Taliban’s support From the point of view of ideology, much of Afghanistan is a fertile ground for the Taliban’s extremist and misogynist ideology to bloom. It is on the basis of ideology that the Taliban have more popular support across Afghanistan (and across ethnic and linguistic groups) than on any other basis. Since the 1978 communist coup in Kabul, Afghans have received a steady dose of religious extremist literature, which makes it easier for them to accept and embrace the Taliban. For instance, when topics such as suicide bombings came up in my conversations with Afghans from various walks of life (including fellow students from Kabul University), many either indirectly supported these tactics or looked the other way as long as only foreigners were targeted. If you had no other option against well-armed invaders, you could resort to suicide bombings as a last resort provided no innocent Afghans were killed, was the final verdict of such conversations. Similarly, many Afghans who regularly indulged in corruption did so thinking and proclaiming that they were squandering the infidels’ money. Taking verses from the Qur'an out of context, it was regularly taught in schools and universities, including at Kabul University’s School of Law and Political Science where I studied, that Christians and Jews could never be our friends. Ironically, the U.S. and World Bank assisted with paying the salaries of Afghan school teachers and university professors, who in turn propagated hatred towards Christians and Jews. Moreover, one could categorise the Afghan society as misogynist, including by Islamic standards. Discrimination against girls starts before their birth—a practice strictly prohibited by Islam. When a woman is pregnant, the family prefers the future baby to be a boy. Mothers who give birth to girls are frowned upon, and are sometimes subjected to verbal abuse and physical violence. Under pressure, it is not uncommon for Afghan women to keep conceiving until a boy is born. Women who have one son make multiple attempts at pregnancy to have at least two. When girls are born, families treat such occasions with either sadness or indifference. As children, girls are expected to do chores and boys are discouraged (directly or indirectly) from doing so. A sister is supposed to cook, wash, and clean the house for her brother and other family members, while the brother may not even bother rinsing his tea cup. In most rural areas and partly in cities as well, girls are discouraged to study beyond grade four or five, as they are expected to get married once they hit puberty. It is a common practice in many parts of Afghanistan that when a man and a woman, especially a husband and a wife, step outside the house “together,” the man walks a meter or so ahead of the woman, who is usually in chadari (the garment that covers women from head to toe), so that he is not seen by the public walking with a woman. Furthermore, we as Muslims know the names of our Prophet’s mother, daughters, wives, and other relatives. However, in Afghanistan it is a social taboo to make mention of one’s female family member’s name. Many Afghan men refer to their wives as their “baggage.” The Afghan society’s overall perception of the status of girls and women is not too different from that of the Taliban. As such, if the Taliban were to make wearing the chadari compulsory again, few (who primarily live in cities and in some cases have either come from abroad or have gone abroad) would object to it. The majority of Afghans would accept the ruling without any major fuss. The Taliban’s Afghan opponents Those who oppose the Taliban are the urban and western-oriented Afghans, who are mainly based in cities such as Kabul, Herat, and Mazar. The anti-Taliban urban Afghans, however, are vastly outnumbered by the conservative rural Afghans, who form the Taliban's support base. In a country, such as Afghanistan, where the majority of the population lives in rural areas, it should be clear which side holds the advantage. It was in urban Afghans, who mostly resided in the “Kabul Bubble,” that the U.S. made a fragile investment over the last 20 years. Ironically, some of these urbanites, who actually had come from abroad and did not even know Afghanistan's official languages, would declare themselves as "representatives of modern Afghanistan.” Most members of the so-called Kabul Bubble did not dare visit rural Afghanistan, which they falsely purported to represent. Even inside the Kabul Bubble, many had their own mini bubbles, where they rarely interacted with those outside their bubbles, and were escorted everywhere by a security detail. Thus, the anti-Taliban, western-oriented Afghans' perception of facts on the ground could not have been more clouded; they lived in their own separate world. When things started to unravel in July and early to mid-August, at first they were surprised and could not believe what was unfolding before their eyes. Once a bit of the truth sank in, thousands—making a nonsense of their being modern Afghanistan's representatives—started rushing to the Kabul airport to catch the first available plane to the safety of western world. This is precisely why many urban-based Afghan singers, artists, and self-styled women’s rights activists are accusing the U.S. of abandoning them, and throwing them to the wolves. That being said, there were certainly also well-meaning anti-Taliban urban Afghans (including a considerable number of ethnic Pashtuns) who had not come from abroad. They did not live in security bubbles, and did want Afghanistan to progress genuinely. Additionally, rural Hazaras and other non-Sunni Muslims across Afghanistan did not support the Taliban either. Yet, these Afghans, too, were a progressive minority within a largely conservative, and at times reactionary, society. One could also employ the 14th century Muslim sociologist Ibn Khaldun’s theory on desert civilisation (rural) vs. sedentary (settled) civilisation to explain the current Afghan rural-urban divide, which favours the Taliban. I will leave that arena to anthropologists to explore further. In conclusion, I would like to emphasise that claims such as the Taliban do not represent Afghanistan could not be further from the truth. The Taliban do represent much of Afghanistan the way it is, without putting a façade on it to make appealing to western audiences. If the Taliban, unlike the well-educated and well-learned scholars of Islam at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, hold extremist and misogynistic views it is because they are a direct product of the semi-literate, rural Afghan society, which holds the same views. The Afghans’ (and by extension as well as the Taliban’s) outlook on life is more influenced by their culture than by Islam.
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on Thursday 2 September 2021
Should the US rely on the Taliban instead of airstrikes to fight ISIS-K?
The US is increasingly concerned about the growing capabilities of the ISIS-K terrorist group after last week’s attack at the Kabul Airport. It’s since launched two separate strikes against its members, the first of which was against some of that attack’s alleged organisers while the second was in downtown Kabul and targeted a terrorist that was reportedly on his way to carry out another suicide attack at the airport. That second strike, however, ended up killing nine members of a single family according to reports. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid told China’s CGTN on Monday that these strikes were “illegal” and “arbitrary”, suggesting instead that “the US should have reported it to us, rather than conduct an arbitrary attack that has resulted in civilian casualties.” That’s a sensible proposal too since US President Joe Biden told Americans last Thursday that ISIS-K is “an arch-enemy of the Taliban” and that his country even passed along the names of Americans traveling to the Kabul Airport to the Taliban so that they could pass their checkpoints. The American leader earlier clarified in his speech that he doesn’t trust the Taliban but is relying on its “self-interest” in ensuring that “ISIS-K does not metastasize beyond what it is, number one. And number two, it’s in their interest that we are able to leave on time, on target.” This is an accurate reflection of current US-Taliban relations, but that makes it all the more curious why Biden didn’t want to outsource his country’s latest anti-ISIS-K operations to the Taliban. It seems to be the case at least at this sensitive point in time so shortly after last week’s terrorist attack that the US wants to show its people that it’s “leading from the front” when it comes to carrying retributive operations against ISIS-K. After all, Biden also told the American people during Thursday’s speech that “We will respond with force and precision at our time, at the place we choose, and the moment of our choosing.” He therefore couldn’t depend on the Taliban for that before the withdrawal ends without provoking another scandal. Looking forward, however, Russian Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov warned that more American strikes in Afghanistan “should not be ruled out” while speaking to the press on Monday. He didn’t directly say so, but it can be interpreted that he might have sought to imply that the US could exploit ISIS-K as a pretext for carrying out more attacks there, perhaps to boost Biden’s plummeting approval rating ahead of next year’s midterms by distracting from his disastrous withdrawal. That scenario could arguably prove destabilising. In terms of the bigger picture, it would be best for the US to share its intelligence about ISIS-K with the Taliban. America of course has domestic soft power interests in flexing its anti-terrorist capabilities in post-withdrawal Afghanistan, especially those self-interested ones related to improving Biden’s popularity at home, but it’s better for it to respect the Taliban’s de facto leadership over Afghanistan if there’s ever to be any hope for a meaningful rapprochement between these hated enemies. The Taliban doesn’t want any problems with the US after it finally leaves Afghanistan. In fact, it would prefer for America to reconstruct the country as a form of reparations. Washington has an interest in doing this because it hopes that February’s agreement to construct a Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan (PAKAFUZ) railway with its three “New Quad” partners will help it geo-strategically reshape the region by expanding its economic influence through post-withdrawal Afghanistan to the Central Asian Republics. For that to happen, though, the US must first recognise Afghanistan’s de facto Taliban-led government as legitimate. That hasn’t yet occurred for two primary reasons. Firstly, it’s too domestically sensitive of an issue immediately after the US’ disastrous withdrawal, and secondly because it hopes to use this as an incentive for the Taliban to keep its prior promises to cut ties with international terrorist groups, assemble an inclusive government, and respect minorities’ and women’s rights. If the US continues bombing ISIS-K, however, then it’ll make it more difficult for the Taliban to agree to the formal establishment of bilateral relations. The group would regard this as a slap in the face of its sovereignty claims, especially after its latest statement. It can’t be seen as desperate to enter into official ties with the US, nor does it actually even need to do so anyhow. The Taliban hopes to receive much-needed economic, financial, and investment aid from China, Russia, and others that can potentially compensate for US aid. Still, it’s best for everyone that the US and the Taliban enjoy pragmatic relations sometime in the future focused on their shared security and development interests. Not doing so could dangerously lead to the scenario wherein the US continues bombing Afghanistan under the ISIS-K pretext but ends up “coincidentally” targeting Chinese, Russian, or other countries’ investments there. It’s those countries that rely more on their new partner’s connectivity and mineral prospects than the US, which can indefinitely wait to utilise PAKAFUZ. China, Russia, and others, however, have a more pressing interest in reconstructing Afghanistan than the US does. America might only stop bombing ISIS-K on its own terms, not the Taliban’s, whatever they might ultimately end up being. Speculatively speaking, these might include preferential reconstruction and mineral extraction contracts for its companies in order to gain an edge over their Chinese, Russian, and other competitors. Only then might the US completely outsource its anti-ISIS-K operations to the Taliban. The only possible scenario that could offset the one that was just described above is if China, Russia, and/or others reverse their current designation of the Taliban as terrorists by recognising them as Afghanistan’s legitimate authorities before the US does and then provide the country with anti-air capabilities for deterring these attacks. That, however, doesn’t appear to be realistic since there’s still a palpable fear among the international community about the Taliban’s grand strategic intentions and whether they’ve truly changed. For these reasons, Mr. Kabulov’s warning about more American strikes against Afghanistan will probably come to pass even though it remains to be seen how regularly it’ll strike that country and whether it’ll even do so for legitimate anti-terrorist reasons. The US isn’t likely to completely outsource its anti-ISIS-K operations to the Taliban until it gets something tangible in return, though it’s unclear exactly what that might be. All that can be hoped for until then is that the US doesn’t kill too many civilians or targets other countries’ investments.
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The Khan-Putin call is a defining moment in Pak-Russian relations
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to call Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan on Wednesday was a defining moment in their countries’ bilateral relations, which have been rapidly improving over the past few years. According to the Kremlin’s official readout of the call: “While discussing the situation in Afghanistan, both sides stressed the importance of maintaining peace and security in the country, preventing violence and establishing an inter-Afghan dialogue that would facilitate the formation of an inclusive government that takes into account the interests of all segments of the population. It was agreed to coordinate approaches to the Afghan issue both in bilateral and multilateral formats. At the same time, it was noted that it would be appropriate to use the capabilities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in ensuring regional stability and the fight against terrorism and the drug threat. The parties touched upon several topics on the bilateral agenda, including the development of trade and economic ties, and the implementation of joint projects in the energy and humanitarian spheres. Russian-Pakistani contacts at various levels will be intensified.” This represents the first-ever tacit acknowledgment that Russia has come to rely on Pakistan to advance its interests, which in this context relate to stabilising Afghanistan after the Taliban’s lightning-fast takeover earlier this month. This suggests that their developing partnership has finally begun to take on strategic dimensions. The Afghan Crisis is arguably the top one in the world right now, but it’s only Pakistan and Russia that have any realistic chance to shape events in that country through their respective ties with the Taliban. Islamabad’s ones are well-known and cultivated over the decades while Moscow’s are relatively new and explained at length in my latest analysis for the Russian International Affairs Council titled “Russia & The Taliban: From Narrative Challenges To Opportunities”. In short, one of the largely overlooked outcomes of the recent Russian-Pakistani partnership was Islamabad facilitating Moscow’s ties with the same group that the Kremlin still officially regards as terrorists but with whom it’s nevertheless pragmatically engaging in the interests of regional peace and security. The Eurasian Great Power considers the Taliban to be an anti-ISIS bulwark and hopes that it’ll stabilise Afghanistan as soon as possible so as to unlock its trans-regional connectivity potential and estimated $3 trillion worth of minerals. The first-mentioned objective refers to February’s agreement to build the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan (PAKAFUZ) railway that Russia can then utilise to finally reach the Indian Ocean like it’s aimed to do for centuries already. As for the second, it wouldn’t just enrich Russia, but would provide much-needed revenue for the Taliban to redistribute throughout its impoverished society and reinvest in reconstructing Afghanistan. These objectives are mutually beneficial and complementary, hence why they’re being prioritised. They can’t be accomplished without Pakistan’s support, however, though Islamabad obviously shares their aims. The South Asian state wants to utilise PAKAFUZ in order to serve as the Central Asian Republic’s (CARs) access point to the global marketplace and also hopes for Afghanistan to sustainably rebuild itself after the war finally ends. The influence that Pakistan and Russia nowadays have with the Taliban can ideally be leveraged to facilitate the group’s goal of assembling an inclusive government and ensuring that it cuts its ties with terrorists. Such an outcome wouldn’t be the end point of the Russian-Pakistani partnership, but the beginning of the entirely new era of bilateral relations that they’re both striving towards. Russia aspires to incorporate Pakistan into its Greater Eurasian Partnership, to which end Afghanistan must first be stabilised and PAKAFUZ constructed. Upon those interconnected objectives being met, Moscow can then diversify economic ties with Islamabad beyond their Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline flagship project and into the commercial sphere. For this to happen, Russia and Pakistan must work more closely than ever before in putting their influence with the Taliban to good use, which explains why President Putin initiated his call with Prime Minister Khan. This symbolically showed that Moscow is deferring to Islamabad’s expertise in this field in order to increase the chances of unlocking the mutual opportunities that they hope to tap into via Kabul. It also symbolically shows that these two former rivals have truly put the past behind them and are ready to chart a new future together. Not only that, but it’s important to point out that President Putin called Prime Minister Khan before US President Joe Biden did, who has yet to talk to the Pakistani leader despite the South Asian state nominally being a so-called “Major Non-Nato Ally” and indispensable to America’s evacuation from Afghanistan. The Russian leader therefore showed that he respects his Pakistani counterpart much more than his American one does, which signifies just how seriously the strategic dynamics are shifting in South Asia. Nevertheless, Russian-Indian relations still remain strong since President Putin spoke to Prime Minister Narendra Modi the day before calling his Pakistani counterpart so nobody should speculate that there will be any worsening of their ties as a result of the latest development. Rather, Russia is simply showing the world that it’s truly restored balance to its South Asian strategy, which builds upon the new model of regional engagement pioneered in April after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid his first trip to Pakistan in 9 years. Russia has indisputably returned to South Asia ever since the start of the year, and in a more balanced way than ever before. While India will still remain the Kremlin’s top partner there, Pakistan will no longer be neglected like in the past. In fact, Russia nowadays needs Pakistan in order to advance its regional interests which finally align with Islamabad’s own, particularly in Afghanistan. Their mutual embrace of geo-economics has made their respective grand strategies of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and CPEC+ complementary through PAKAFUZ. Considering the context in which President Putin initiated his call to Prime Minister Khan, which includes not just the Afghan Crisis in general but also Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s ongoing tour to each of Afghanistan’s neighbours apart from China, there’s no question that Russia nowadays relies on close coordination with Pakistan for achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan. This observation marks a defining moment in their relations and shows that they’ve finally begun to take on strategic dimensions.
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Fawad Alam gives befitting reply to critics-turned-fans
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on Wednesday 1 September 2021
Pakistan name 20-player ODI squad for New Zealand series
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